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Abstract 
 
 
This interdisciplinary paper focuses on an evolutionary and problem-solving approach to intellectual 
property rights in order to discuss some controversial issues in the European legislation on computer 
software and in some recent competition law case (e.g. the Microsoft case). 
Given such claims, we argue that a standard “Coasian” approach to property rights, designed to cope 
with the externalities of semi public goods may not be appropriate for computer software, as it may 
decrease both ex-ante incentives to innovation and ex-post efficiency of diffusion. On the other hand 
the institutional definition of property rights may strongly influence the patterns of technological 
evolution and division of labour in directions which are not necessarily optimal. 
Taking the European legislation on computer software and some recent competition law cases as an 
example, this paper intends to show that a more careful balancing of costs and benefits, both in static 
and dynamic terms should be suitable for a pro-innovation IP regime and competition policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The current legal attitude favouring a strong intellectual property rights regime is underpinned 
by the economic reasoning that, unless property-like rights for ideas are established, the 
inventor would not have the necessary incentive “to devote the time and effort required to 
produce the invention” (Friedman, 1962, who also extends this reasoning to the “writer”). 
Without IPR’s, others could reap the fruits of the inventor’s intellectual works. This results 
from two peculiar characteristics of ideas, that is their non-excludability and non-rivarly. 
Because of non-excludability, the inventor is expected to suffer free-riding problems, whereas 
non-rivarly causes non optimal rationing. The property right-like protection is therefore a 
means to facilitate exchange and internalise externalities (Demsetz, 1967). 
 
The most recent economic literature, however, has adopted a much more cautious approach in 
evaluating the likely impact on innovation of intellectual property rights regimes. From the 
legal scholarly community, also, many have invoked  a thoughtful review of the available 
protection system because of its negative impact on innovation and creativity. On the 
legislative side, we can witness a few, albeit still quite hesitant, signs that a revision  in the 
general policy attitude overwhelmingly in favour of a strong legal protection for new ideas 
may slowly be under way. This is shown, e.g., by the rejection of the European Directive on 
Computer Implemented Inventions by the European Parliament or by the recent debate on the 
“interoperability clause” in French copyright law. According to some commentators, there are 
also some promising signs that U.S. Supreme Court might take a more pro-competitive stance 
towards patent law in the near future (Reichman, 2006). Moreover, the European 
Commission’s decision on the Microsoft competition case, currently under judicial revision, 
takes quite a critical stance towards the Redmond firm’s claim that the refusal to provide to 
competitors in the workgroup server market interoperability information allegedly covered by 
various forms of intellectual property rights was justified by the need to protect its 
investments and, by that, its innovation incentives (Vezzoso, 2006).   
 
Much in line with the now “fashionable” critical approach, in this paper we point to some 
dynamic inefficiencies of intellectual property rights from an evolutionary/problem-solving 
perspective. In particular, we contend that the characteristics of the production processes and 
of learning processes themselves should deserve a much greater attention in the actual debate. 
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In the following we will elaborate extensively on this approach and then move to the analysis 
of the legal treatment of reverse engineering of computer programs. 
 
 
2. An evolutionary/problem-solving approach to intellectual property 
 
The traditional perspective on property rights is a prototypical application of a Coasian 
perspective. The knowledge generation process of R&D is exposed to the possibility of strong 
positive externalities that determine underinvestment. The Coasian solution is therefore to 
define property rights and create markets for the externality. However, in the case of 
knowledge externalities things are complicated by a few specific factors. First, the monopoly 
right conferred by any property right has in this case much more serious consequences as by 
definition innovative knowledge has no (or little) competing fungible knowledge resources. 
Assigning enforceable IPR’s amounts therefore to assigning high and persistent rents. Second, 
if knowledge is non-rival (but non-rivarly is somehow over-emphasized) then it is somehow 
paradoxical that the institutional solution to the incentive problem for knowledge production 
our society has preferred is to introduce an artificial scarcity for a fundamental resource for 
which the curse of scarcity would not apply. 
 
But there is another and more subtle sense in which the Coasian solution is at least in need of 
further and deeper investigation, and concerns the issue of the “granularity” of property rights 
(Marengo et al. 2000). In principle, the Coasian perspective would imply that property should 
be granted and enforced separately on every – however “small” – right with economic value, 
and in some sense this route has been followed by the theory and practice of IPR’s in the last 
decades, when, as well documented in a wide array of empirical studies, the domain of 
(technological) knowledge has been so finely divided by property claims - on essentially 
complementary pieces of information - that the cost of reassembling constituent rights in 
order to engage in further research seems to be charging a heavy burden on technological 
advance. In the realm of scientific and technological research, this has taken the form of a 
spiral of overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners reaching ever further 
upstream. This attitude towards fragmentation is much in line with a Coasian effort to create 
as many rights as there are markets. Actually, the co-extensiveness of markets and property 
rights is hailed by economic wisdom as the setting in which competition can promote 
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efficiency at its best: no transaction costs coupled with well defined and perfectly 
exchangeable property rights lead to perfect allocative efficiency. 
 
Ideally, in a perfectly Coasian world a market would exist for every right with an economic 
value (Coase 1960). This presupposes individual property rights to be perfectly (and 
costlessly) defined, perfectly (and costlessly) enforced and perfectly (and costlessly) 
exchangeable. In this way every inefficient allocation would be avoided. In turn, the whole 
argument presupposes the very possibility of a limitless separability of property rights and of 
an ever finer definition thereof. National authorities, both in the US and the EU, have adopted 
an attitude towards patenting that clearly reflects these principles. As a matter of fact, IP 
rights are being granted on increasingly fragmented “chunks” of knowledge such as single 
genes, databases, algorithms or parts thereof. However, as suggested by Coase himself, the 
finest possible property rights structure is very likely to induce less rather than more 
competition as underlying markets will be so thin, with respect to the number of agents 
involved, as to induce monopolistic behaviours and considerable transaction costs. It thus 
seems that, in the end, allocative inefficiencies might arise which are not less serious than 
those which a strong and fine-grained rights structure was meant to eliminate. Indeed, a fast 
growing literature, both in the economic and legal discipline, is currently debating and 
questioning the idea that “more property rights imply more efficiency” and the idea that 
“commons, however defined and practiced are tragic”.  
 
In this respect, we suggest that the problem-solving nature of the innovative process implies 
that more property rights do not necessarily generate more innovation and that moreover the 
institutional arrangements of rights do not only impinge upon the speed of innovation but also 
upon its direction. From a theoretical point of view, the Coasian argument is based upon the 
(often only implicit) assumption that technology is given, technological separable interfaces 
are pre-defined by the state of technological knowledge and property rights (and transaction 
costs) only determine the efficiency of different coordination modes. This assumption is very 
clearly expressed by Williamson, who begins his analysis imagining that “in the origin there 
were markets”, i.e. that markets would – if it wasn’t for transactions costs – always provide 
the most efficient mode of allocating resources.  
 
As argued by some critics (cf. Dow, 1987, Granovetter, 1985, Bowles, 1985, Marengo and 
Dosi 2005), both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence run strongly against this 
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“neutrality” assumption and contend that institutional arrangements and technologies co-
evolve and property rights and coordination modes do influence the pace and direction of 
technological change. In particular, more finely defined intellectual property rights may cause 
sub-optimal technological trajectories. More in general we submit that the efficiency and 
sustainability of resource coordination systems crucially depend on technological 
characteristics of resources themselves and on contractual and institutional patterns of their 
usage in precise historical moments. 
 
There can be little contention that the production of new software presents the typical 
characteristics of problem-solving activities. Notably, it is a process of designing viable 
solutions in a huge combinatorial problem space, characterized by very diffused 
interdependencies. As pointed out by Simon (1969), problem-solving by boundedly rational 
agents must necessarily proceed by decomposing any large, complex and intractable problem 
into smaller sub-problems that can be solved independently, by promoting what could be 
called the division of problem-solving labour. At the same time, note that the extent of the 
division of problem-solving labour is limited by the existence of interdependencies. If sub-
problem decomposition separates interdependent elements, then solving each sub-problem 
independently does not allow overall optimization. In this respect, an innovation, e.g. in 
software, is the outcome of the search in large combinatorial spaces of components that must 
be closely coordinated. A first important consequence – which emerges very clearly in 
software design – is that decompositions are mere conjectures which allow to tackle complex 
problems but at the same time pose limiting constraint to the kind of solutions which can then 
be developed within the given decomposition. Because of these limits and constraint having a 
variety of heterogeneous decompositions and architectures has in general positive 
consequences in terms of the evolutionary properties of the system. 
 
Solving (technological) problems usually requires the complex coordination of many 
elements or components which present strong interdependencies (i.e. modifying one 
component has broad consequences on the performance of many other components), which 
are – if anything for complexity reasons – only partly understood and grasped by problem 
solvers. Thus the search space of a problem typically presents many local optima and 
marginal contributions of components can rapidly switch from negative to positive values, 
depending on which value is assumed by the other components. For instance, adding a more 
powerful engine could lower the performance and the reliability of an aircraft if other 
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components are not simultaneously adapted (Vincenti, 1991). In a chess game, a notionally 
optimal strategy could involve, for example, castling at a given moment in the development of 
the game but the same castling as a part of some sub-optimal (but effective) strategy could 
turn out to be a losing move. Finally, introducing some routines, practices or incentive 
schemes that have proven superior in a given organizational context could prove harmful in a 
context where other elements are not appropriately co-adapted. As a consequence, in the 
presence of strong interdependencies, one cannot optimize a system by separately optimizing 
each element it is made of.  
 
It is important to remark that the introduction of any decentralized interaction mechanism, 
such as a competitive market for each component does not, in general, solve the problem in an 
optimal way. For instance, if we assume that each component is traded in a competitive 
market, superior components might never be selected. Thus, interdependencies undermine the 
effectiveness of the selection process as a device for adaptive optimization and they introduce 
forms of path-dependency with lock-in into sub-optimal states that do not originate from the 
frictions and costs connected to the selection mechanism, but from the internal complexity of 
the entities undergoing selection. 
 
As Simon (1969) pointed out, an optimal decomposition (i.e. a decomposition that divides 
into separate sub-problems all and only the elements that are independent from each other) 
can only be designed by someone who has a perfect knowledge of the problem (including its 
optimal solution). On the contrary, boundedly rational agents will normally be forced to 
design near-decompositions, that is decompositions that try to put together, within the same 
sub-problem, only those components whose interdependencies are (or, we shall add, agents 
believe to be) more important for the overall system performance. However, near-
decompositions involve a fundamental trade-off: on the one hand, finer decompositions 
exploit the advantages of decentralized local adaptation, that is, the use of a selection 
mechanism for achieving coordination “for free” together with parallelism and adaptation 
speed. But on the other hand, finer decompositions imply a higher probability that 
interdependent components are separated into different sub-problems and therefore cannot, in 
general, be optimally adjusted together. As shown in Marengo and Dosi (2005) and Marengo 
et al. (2000), in domains of highly interdependent entities, such as complementary patents, 
there are delicate trade-offs between the exploitation of the advantages of decentralization and 
 7 
the need to control for complex interdependencies and that optimal dynamic search path 
usually are not generated by highly fragmented structures. 
 
One way of expressing the limits that interdependencies pose to the division of problem-
solving labour is that market performance signals are not able to effectively drive 
decentralized search in the problem space. Local moves in the “right direction” might well 
decrease the overall performance if some other elements are not properly tuned. As Simon 
puts it, since an entity (e.g. an organism in biology or an organization in economics) only 
receives feedback from the environment concerning the fitness of the whole entity, only under 
conditions of near independence can the usual selection processes work successfully for 
complex systems (Simon 2002). A further aspect concerns the property that, in general, the 
search space of a problem is not given exogenously, but is constructed by individuals and 
organizations as a subjective representation of the problem itself and through the very process 
of problem-solving which defines a focal framework for future representations. If the division 
of problem-solving labour is limited by interdependencies, the structure of interdependencies 
itself depends on how the problem is framed by problem-solvers. Sometimes problem-solvers 
make major leaps forward by reframing the same problem in a novel way. As shown by many 
case studies, major innovations often appear when various elements that were well-known are 
recombined and put together under a different perspective. Indeed, one can go as far as to say 
that it is the representation of a problem that determines its purported difficulty and that one 
of the fundamental functions of organizations is precisely to implement collective 
representations of the problems they face. 
 
As we have briefly recalled above, the economic reasoning underlying the current policy 
attitude towards intellectual property rights can be held to mainly reflect the Coasian view on 
economic organisation. Admittedly, the definition of many markets or IPR’s could provide, 
under certain circumstances, a good solution to the innovation problem (but perhaps only if 
opportunism, agency and other problems are neglected). In fact, the higher the degree of 
decentralization the smaller the portion of the search space and therefore the speed and the 
directions of the decentralized local adaptation. However, near decomposability can be an 
exceedingly powerful architecture for effective organization of a complex problem like 
innovation in many sectors. This is likely to yield technological trajectories that are not 
optimal. In more formal terms, if the entities under selection are made of many components 
which are interacting in a complex way, the resulting selection landscape will present many 
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local optima (Kaufman 1993) and selection forces will be unlikely to drive such entities to the 
global optima. The higher the degree of decentralization the smaller the portion of the search 
space which is explored and the lower therefore the probability that the optimal solutions are 
included in such a small portion of space. Sub-optimality and diversity of organizational 
structures can persistently survive in spite of strong selection forces (Levinthal 1997). Sub-
optimality is due to the persistence of inferior features which cannot be selected out because 
of their tight connections with other favourable features. In other words, whenever the entities 
under selection have some complex internal structure, the power of selective pressure is 
limited by the laws governing internal structures. 
 
The main point here is that the incentives or market solution for innovation is most likely to 
produce less technological efficiency. The evolutionary/problem-solving approach  is also 
able to show that there are quite delicate  trade-offs between different levels of suboptimality 
in the achieved solution and different speeds of adaptation. Careful consideration of the 
characteristics of production processes and of learning processes would therefore seem to 
suggest that market-like decentralized mechanisms do not provide appropriate signals in this 
early problem-solving/innovation phase. As search proceeds and a local peak (a set of 
standards in the techno-organizational design problem) is selected, the degree of 
decentralization can be greatly increased in order to allow for fast climbing of this peak (and 
indeed transaction costs factors can very well be responsible at this stage for variations of the 
degree of integration), but the more decentralization is pushed forward, the more 
unlikely it will be that new and better local optima can be discovered. This would seem to 
involve the important policy consideration that the system should allow for a more flexible 
coordination of interdependent elements (“pieces of knowledge”) than the Coasian market 
solution would allow for. In the next Section we will elaborate on these insights taking the 
rules of reverse engineering of computer software as an example.  
 
 
3. An application: the case of reverse engineering of computer software 
 
 3.1 The IP protection of computer programs in a nutshell 
IPR’s norms can be seen as the most relevant rules of the game providing for the institutional 
structure of innovation systems. Among IPR’s regimes of different states or 
intergovernmental organisations (like the European Community as far as e.g. community 
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trade marks are concerned), there still exist substantial differences, and this in spite of policy 
moves towards globally harmonized standards of protection. Moreover, the levels of 
exclusivity accorded by the various intellectual property titles vary significantly.  
 
On the one end of the spectrum we possibly have the patent system. The conditions to be met 
in order to enjoy patent protection are somehow more stringent than those for other forms of 
IPR’s. In Europe, for example, an invention may enjoy protection from patent law provided it 
is novel, it is susceptible of industrial application, and involves an inventive step. Patent 
protection grants that the results of individual search for solutions become “proprietary” and 
cannot be freely used by others. More precisely, a patent covers the inventive idea as such (as 
expressed in the patent claims defining the matter for which the protection in sought in terms 
of technical features), and can be invoked even against independent inventors of the same 
idea. Further, not only a third party’s devise (or process) that falls within the literal scope of a 
patent claim infringes the patent, but also a devise “equivalent” to the claimed invention may 
face infringing liability. Improvements of the invention and follow-on innovations can be 
actively prevented by the patent owner (or his patentees), and this in spite of the fact that most 
leading patent regimes contain experimental use or research exemptions, albeit of a very 
narrow extent. As part of the patent "bargain," the would-be patentee must disclose the 
specifications of his work. This requirement aims at giving the public technological know-
how, and it is obviously particularly important when inventions are not easily reverse-
engineered, or, in economic terms, are partly excludable ideas (whereas, for inventions like 
e.g. pharmaceuticals, bringing the product to the market as such normally implies disclosure). 
Moreover, most patent laws foresee provisions for compulsory licensing, but they apply only 
under very strict conditions. Finally, in patent law there are no further explicit “fair use” 
provisions. 
 
Starting from the 1960s, U.S. courts had been holding that software was not eligible for patent 
protection, since it was considered similar to abstract ideas and laws of nature. Since the 1981 
Diamond v. Diehr landmark decision, however, both the U.S. courts and the U.S. Patent 
Office gradually broadened the scope of protection granted to software-related inventions,. 
Today, Courts apply the so called “useful, concrete and tangible result” test to software patent 
claims, and do not require the operation of the program to affect the physical world in any 
tangible way. As seen above, the would-be patentee is required by law to disclose the 
specifications of his work. Unfortunately, however, in the case of computer software this 
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requirement prove scarcely effective, since where the patentability of computer software is 
admitted, as in the U.S., there is no obligation to disclose the implementing source code of the 
program. Finally, since in patent law there are no further explicit “fair use” provisions, reverse 
engineering through decompiling would most probably be judged illegal under patent law, 
and certainly so in case of pure software claims. In fact, the very moment a patented program 
is run on a computer for decompilation, a object code copy of the program in the RAM 
memory is realized which could be interpreted as an infringement (Cohen and Lemley 2001). 
 
In Europe, the Convention on the granting of European patents (EPC in the following) 
expressly excludes patent protection for computer programs (non-patentability because of the 
subject matter). Therefore, for pure software to be protected on the basis of patents, the exclusion 
under Article 52 EPC should have to be removed. Computer implemented inventions (e.g. where a 
devise is controlled by embedded processors - microchips), though, have increasingly been 
granted patent protection by the European Patent Office (which issues “bundles” of national 
patents). This evolution within Europe has been marked by some landmark cases. In Koch & 
Sterzel/X-ray, for instance, the Board of Appeals ruled that “..if the program controls the 
operation of a conventional general-purpose computer so as technically to alter its 
functioning, the unit consisting of program and computer combined may be a patentable 
invention”. Moreover, the Board recognized that “a claim directed to a technical process 
carried out under the control of a program (whether implemented in hardware or in software) 
cannot be regarded as relating to a computer program as such within the meaning of Article 
52 EPC”. Admittedly, making a distinction between software eligible for patents under 
European law and software that is not cannot be regarded as an easy task. With this problem 
in mind, the “technical contribution requirement” was put at the core of the 2002 European 
Commission’s proposal of a directive on the patentability of computer-implemented 
inventions, which was then rebutted by the European Parliament. As many commentators 
have stressed, however, the notion of “technicality” put forth by the Commission would have 
hardly improved legal certainty. 
 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, we encounter the “open movement” in connection with 
computer programs (“open source”) and now increasingly artistic works (“open content”, 
mostly associated with the Creative Commons project). In case of open source software, the 
idea is also by itself proprietary but it is freely available to others in the form of source code. 
Users of open source are typically permitted to use, copy, distribute and modify the software, 
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but only as long as they abide by the rules of the open source licence agreements they have 
agreed to (General Public License, Lesser General Public License, MIT License, etc.). 
Interestingly, there are significant differences among open source license agreements. Some 
require for instance the obligation by the licensee to release and license back to the open 
source community all modifications of the source code, whereas others permit modifications 
of the code to be kept proprietary under certain conditions. 
 
Moreover, software owners can rely on trade secrets law for the protection of their intellectual 
works. This further  property-like right lasts as long as computer program’s unique character 
remains confidential. Reverse engineering is permitted without limitations. But the 
“weakness” of a trade secret is that it vanishes once it is broken. Of course, the risk of a trade 
secret being lost is particularly high if the software is licensed. 
 
The last, and somehow more “traditional” and pervasive form of IP for software is copyright 
protection. According to Article 10 of TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
International Property Rights), computer programs, whether in source or object code, are 
protected as literary works provided that they are original and tangible. Under Article 9, 
copyright protects the actual code of the computer program, and the way the instructions have 
been drawn up, but not the idea underlying them. Therefore, as well as for patents, the 
solutions covered by copyright law cannot be freely used; but copyright protects not the idea 
as such but its “original expression”. Thus, for example, copyright covers the particular form 
of a statuette used as a lamp base, but not the idea of using a statuette of a human figure as a 
lamp base. In similar terms, for what concerns computer software, source code and object 
code are typically protected against literal copying, but not the program’s ultimate function. 
The idea underlying a given software could then be used to “build” a different  program. Moreover, 
and differently from patent protection, no disclosure obligation is foreseen.  
 
Copyright is the form of software’s IP protection we will deal with in more detail. In 
particular, our main focus in the following will be on the legal treatment of the reverse 
engineering of computer programs. First of all, we develop an economic problem-solving 
perspective on reverse engineering, and then we will take a closer look at the relevant rules of 
law, especially following European Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer 
programs. 
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3.2 On the economics of reverse-engineering from an evolutionary/problem-solving 
perspective 
Reverse engineering is widely diffused in computer software, but usually not for the purpose 
of making a copy of the good itself, as it is often the case in reverse engineering of physical 
artefacts. On the one hand, in fact, in order to make a perfect copy of a piece of software one 
does not have to understand anything of its internal structure and functioning, but simply to 
duplicate the executable files. On the other hand, decompiling and fully reverse engineering a 
computer program in the form of an executable or object file is usually more difficult, time 
consuming and expensive than writing from scratch a new program which performs similar 
tasks.  
 
Reverse engineering in physical artefacts is normally carried out with the purpose of acquiring 
information on know-how (how the good is designed, how it works, how specific technical 
problems are solved, etc.) which is not available in codified version. Computer software is 
indeed a “perfect” codification of its own design, functions and operations, but if the source 
code is not made public, the object or executable codes are not understandable by a human 
reader. This obvious observation gives an interesting perspective on the much debated issue 
of the legal treatment of  reverse engineering. If we expressly consider copyright law, this 
debate seems somehow paradoxical in its very existence. Copyright has always been applied 
to artefacts whose inner structure was largely transparent and easily grasped by any customer. 
When reading a book the very act of consuming the good is nothing but a form of reverse 
engineering, in which the inner structure and the technical solution employed become 
perfectly transparent at least to an experienced and cultivated reader. On the same token, for 
consumers having sufficient technical skills, listening to a musical composition or looking at a 
painting or sculpture reveals all the secrets of its creation. An important consequence is that 
consumers can freely learn from copyrighted material, re-use it and re-combine it with 
elements of other (copyrighted or non-copyrighted) material in order to produce new ideas 
and materials or simply to enhance own education, skills and competencies. J.S. Bach’s 
sublime art of counterpoint is made of a series of technical solutions to composition problems, 
which have been freely studied, acquired, re-used, adapted to their own needs by the 
following generations of composers. In a sense all the cumulative process of culture has been 
based upon the free reverse engineering of (possibly copyrighted) creations of other people’s 
minds. Compiled computer code is an exception and probably the first one in history, as it is 
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indeed a totally codified piece of knowledge but the code is not understandable by even an 
expert human reader. The process of building knowledge upon knowledge which is normally 
allowed under copyright regime is therefore hindered in the case of closed source software. 
 
All in all, reverse engineering of computer programs is not something the average user would 
aim to, already quite satisfied if the program runs smoothly on his hardware. Reverse 
engineering is a matter for specific categories of users, such as those whose peculiar needs are 
not fully accommodated by the purchased product, and for the broader category of software 
developers. Most reverse engineering in software is actually carried out with the purpose of 
learning: learning programming techniques, learning solutions to specific technical problems, 
learning the functioning of specific routines in order to modify them for user’s customized 
needs, learning, especially, the functional specifications necessary to make a compatible 
program. The issues therefore should not be whether and, possibly, to which extent reverse 
engineering is legal, but whether copyrighting something written in a language which keeps 
its content hidden to customers should be allowed. 
 
In spite of the obvious knowledge-creating and diffusing characteristic of reverse engineering, 
in a Coasian world this activity would hardly find a safe place. The individual (or collective) 
discovery attempts should be viewed as acts of free-riding in an otherwise well functioning 
IPR market. A party interested in knowing the inner secrets of an item for some commercial 
purpose which could prejudice the economic interests of the IP rights owner should  attempt 
to obtain that information by way of licence. In fact, thanks to the  licensing system, the IP 
owner recovers its research and development costs. If bypassing licensing by way of reverse 
engineering were allowed, according to this view, there would not be other means of finding 
out what is efficient and what rights should therefore be enforced. Unless some clear source 
of market failure is identified, the IP owner’s interest to license and by that reap the economic 
benefits from any market use of its ideas should not be interfered with. Only uses that could 
not have been reasonably licensed anyway should be free for use.  
 
On the contrary, we suggest that reverse engineering is not in itself a threat to a firm’s 
incentives to produce innovative software, as this threat comes rather from the so-called 
(almost) infinite expansibility (David, 1992), i.e. the possibility to copy digital goods in form 
of computer files very cheaply. It is rather a threat to a firm’s strategy to keep a proprietary 
position on interoperability standards, i.e. on the interfaces between platforms, operating 
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systems and application software which play a crucial role in competition. Designing 
computer software is in fact a prototypical example of a complex quasi-decomposable 
problem: designers make conjectural decompositions of the hugely complex problem and 
establish communication protocols between the quasi-separated components. Such 
communication protocols are sometimes key interfaces for interoperability as they constitute 
the fundamental links between different parts of an otherwise unitary system. 
 
From a firm’s perspective the choice between making such protocols freely available or not is 
a difficult one. If protocols are freely available, the system becomes open, and it is very likely 
that other producers will start developing compatible software and more customers will be 
attracted by the system. But, on the other hand, the firm itself may loose control of its initial 
advantage and be exposed to too much competition on all the parts of the system. A vivid 
example is represented by IBM, which opted for an open system. From the system’s point of 
view this strategy was certainly successful as IBM’s model of pc has come to dominate the 
market, but it was not such a success from IBM’s point of view, as the latter quickly lost its 
competitive advantage both in the hardware market against specialized and more cost efficient 
component producers and in the software market against Microsoft, which on the contrary 
tried to keep the system as closed as possible. It must be also pointed out that because of 
various well known technological and market reasons, in the meantime the most profitable 
part of the market has progressively moved from hardware to software. 
 
 Also closed interfaces, however, may be detrimental from the firm’s perspective as they may 
hinder the diffusion of the system if there exist competing ones which, thanks to openness, 
offer a wider range of applications and higher opportunity to respond to specific customers’ 
needs. 
 
From a social welfare perspective, instead, the main question is whether developers of closed 
systems would choose not to develop them if forced to reveal interface standards, or to 
tolerate individual or collective attempts to gather the relevant information. As we have 
previously argued, the issue is not the danger to have expensively developed programs copied 
and reproduced at almost zero cost, but to have independent producers entering the market 
with compatible alternative programs. The question does not have an easy answer, but the 
empirical evidence which shows the widespread co-existence of open and closed systems 
providing similar services seems to suggest that closeness is not a sine qua non condition. 
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From a problem solving perspective there is little doubt that the inevitable inefficiencies 
determined by conjecturally decomposing systems which present strong and widespread 
interdependencies, should at least be compensated by the advantages of introducing 
competitive markets for each quasi-separated component because, if the architecture is kept 
under a strict monopoly, there is no room for adaptation driven by competition. Moreover, as 
discussed above, closed source codes hinder a fundamental collective learning mechanism 
and is bound to reduce knowledge cumulation. 
 
Therefore, from an evolutionary/problem-solving perspective, the act of reverse engineering 
would seem to acquire quite a different significance. As we have already pointed out, 
interdependencies among “chunks of knowledge” such as distinctive pieces of software are 
not known in advance to anyone but make out a substantial part of the trial-and-error activities 
conducted by agents working on complex problems. Despite the fact that these attempts are 
mostly of a “commercial” nature and also potentially able to prejudice the economic interests 
of those who can already claim IP rights on “chunks of knowledge”, their social value per se 
can hardly be denied. Given the complexity of the problem, it seems, a collective search 
strategy quite opposite to the “market partitioning” philosophy would seem a more efficient 
solution from a technological point of view. In this respect, it is not evident that reverse 
engineering is a free taking of somebody’s else legitimate rewards for his innovative efforts. 
On the contrary, it resembles more  a collective innovative activity to discover 
interdependencies among elements that form a complex system. 
 
 
3.3 An evolutionary/problem solving preliminary assessment of the rules on reverse 
engineering of computer programs in the EU 
All modern IPR’s regimes provide for some levers tempering the IP owner’s assertion of the 
exclusive right to use “his own” ideas. They seek to draw a balance between, on the one hand, 
providing an incentive for the creation of works desired by society and, on the other hand, 
insuring enough freedom (“public domain”) to permit later comers to build on the existing 
intellectual achievements for further technological and cultural advances. Much in line with 
this fundamental trade-off, the European Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer 
programs (in the following European Software Directive), aiming at the harmonization of the 
laws of member States of the EU, contains a so-called decompilation exception for purposes 
of developing interoperable programs.  
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Similarly, some key decisions by U.S. courts explicitly considered, and allowed, reverse 
engineering for that purpose. Thus, it has been stated by that reverse engineering object code 
to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer programme is fair use. Thus, Sega v. 
Accolade involved computer games producers. Sega was at the time producing the Genesis 
console and had a leading position in the market of both consoles and games also thanks to its 
policy of not revealing the specifications necessary to have non-Sega produced or licensed 
games running on the same console. Accolade did exactly that: by reverse engineering they 
acquired such specifications and started selling Accolade produced games running on Sega 
consoles. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that “[D]isassembly of copyrighted object code is, as a 
matter of law, a fair use of the copyrighted work if such disassembly provides the only means 
of access to those elements of the code that are protected by copyright and the copier has a 
legitimate reason for seeking such access”.  
 
Whereas the U.S. courts rely on the broad fair-use provision in copyright law to assert the 
lawfulness of reverse engineering, in the European Union a specific rule is provided, stating 
that copyright in a computer program, under certain circumstances, is not infringed by 
decompilation activities. Thus, under Art. 6(1) of the European Software Directive, the 
authorization of the IP rightholder is not required where reproduction of the code and 
translation of its form are indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the 
interoperability of an independently created computer program. This decompilation exception 
is enforced by the provision of Art.9(1) that anti-decompilation clauses in software contracts 
are null and void. One of the preliminary issues here is to understand what it is exactly meant 
under interoperability and the Directive defines it “as the ability to exchange information and 
mutually to use the information which has been exchanged”. Interoperability under the 
Software Directive, therefore, refers to the ability of a software to exchange information 
(communicate) with another software (software-to software interoperability). 
 
However, under the European Software Directive, some additional conditions should be met, 
among which that the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously 
been readily available to the person decompiling the program and that the acts of 
decompilation are confined to the parts of the original program which are necessary to 
achieve interoperability. Moreover, the information obtained thanks to decompilation should 
not be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the independently created 
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computer program and should not be given to others, except when necessary for the 
interoperability of the independently created computer program. Finally, that information 
should not be used for the development, production or marketing of a computer program 
substantially similar in its expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright. 
 
Apparently, the interoperability provision under the European Software Directive was the 
result of a compromise, aiming at accommodating substantially diverging interests. Thus, for 
instance, major U.S. computer companies had lobbied intensively not to have a 
decompilation-for-interoperability exception inserted in the final text of the Council Directive. 
At least some commentators and interested parties would agree that it has worked rather well 
since its adoption, almost 15 years ago. Indeed, a recent European Commission’s Report 
concludes that "the [Software]Directive and in particular the decompilation provisions were 
the result of intensive debate among all interested circles and the balance found then appears 
to be still valid today" (EC Commission, 2004).  
 
From an evolutionary/problem-solving perspective on reverse engineering, however, it could 
be argued that the decompilation clause under the European Software Directive is too 
narrowly crafted. In fact, it would seem to neglect some essential characteristics of the 
production and learning processes we briefly recalled in the previous Sections. In particular, 
interdependencies among distinctive pieces of software very often are not known in advance 
to anyone but are gradually discovered thanks to trial-and-error activities conducted by 
agents. From a technological point of view, this collective search strategy to discover 
interdependencies among elements that form a complex system has an indisputable value, that 
should be reflected on the legal treatment of reverse engineering. In this respect, the statutory 
limitation to only those which are actually creating compatible product, would seem to create 
a heavy and unnecessary burden on the parties seeking the application of the decompilation 
provision. This becomes even more apparent considering that there is no research-exception, 
or error correction-exception for decompilation. Instead, Sega v. Accolade, mentioned above, 
states that there may be other legitimate purposes for decompilation.  
 
Moreover, the European Directive limits follow-on uses that can be made of information 
obtained in the course of decompilation. The decompiler cannot publish information learned 
during reverse engineering. In fact, Article 6(2) of the Directive prevents the publication or 
trafficking in information by those who have decompiled existing programs. Decompilers are 
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therefore prevented from diffusing the information they learned in the course of their reverse 
engineering efforts, by that at least partly recouping their expenses From an 
evolutionary/problem solving perspective, it seems, there could be sound reasons to rebut this 
ample restriction on the uses the decompiler can make of the information acquired. 
 
A more general question, raised in the context of  the European Microsoft case under 
competition law, is whether a reverse engineering exception should in most cases be regarded 
as appropriate, or, under certain circumstances, an obligation to disclose interoperability 
information should be imposed. As the European Commission itself affirmed in its Microsoft 
Europe decision “(D)epending on the size of the program to be decompiled, reverse-
engineering may be very costly and time-consuming, and there may also be technical 
barriers”. Moreover, through legitimate actions such as upgrading the software, compatibility 
could easily be broken. Therefore, the Commission concluded that “reverse engineering . as 
opposed to disclosures from Microsoft, does not constitute a viable solution for companies 
willing to compete with Microsoft on the work group server operating system market” (paras. 
36 and 683-687 ff.). The Commission is certainly correct in pointing out the difficulties, 
uncertainties and costs of reverse engineering. From the evolutionary/problem solving 
perspective, however, a broadly framed decompilation provision, fostering not only the 
competitors’ individual but also collective discovery endeavours would possibly seem more 
adequate.  
 
Finally, even more serious threats to the reverse engineering of software under copyright law 
could derive from the legal reinforcement of the technical measures to protect digital content. 
The underlying, alleged reason for outlawing circumvention measures was that, otherwise, 
copyrighted works provided digitally would have been too vulnerable to infringements The 
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty foresees that the member States should provide “adequate 
protection” and “effective remedies” against circumvention of technical protection measures, 
and both the U.S. and the European legislators have made it illegal to circumvent those 
measures. Already, there have been a few attempts by firms in the U.S. to prevent their 
competitors from circumventing technological measures in order to reverse engineer products. 
Moreover, at the European level, some advocate the introduction for computer programs of 
anti-circumvention provisions, with the possible effect of preventing or restricting the 
application of the decompilation-for-interoperability exception provided for in the European 
Software Directive.  
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4. Preliminary conclusions  
The production of new software presents the typical characteristics of problem-solving 
activities. It is based upon conjectural sub-problem decompositions, whereby a decomposition 
establishes an overall design which on the one allow the search for solution of sub-problems 
of manageable complexity, along with division of labour and specialization, but on the other 
hand puts clear limits on the type of solution which can be produced within that given 
architecture and almost inevitably generates inefficiencies and bottlenecks in the search 
process. In addition, the production of new software displays strong cumulativeness, mutual 
learning effects, re-usability, and, being part of a complex system, suffers from the 
interoperability problem. 
 
In this paper we have argued that a traditional Coasian perspective on intellectual property 
rights does not give a satisfactory account of these peculiarities, as it is entirely focused upon 
the solution of a purported externality “problem”. We could say on the contrary that in 
problem-solving technologies externalities are not a problem but a part of the solution. In 
particular, we have suggested that reverse engineering is not usually carried out in computer 
software with the purpose of merely producing cheaper copies of other people’s innovative 
products, but with the purpose of learning and ensuring interoperability. 
 
From a legal point of view, the evolutionary/problem-solving perspective could possibly 
provide distinctive arguments supporting a clear IP provision in favour of reverse engineering 
(see e.g. Samuelson and Scotchmer 2002 and Cohen and Lemley 2001 for other potential 
benefits of reverse engineering). Of course, as far as software is covered by patent law, this 
branch of law should foresee the possibility to lawfully decompile other parties’ software, not 
only to achieve interoperability but also for (re)search, albeit commercial, purposes. Where a 
reverse engineering exception is expressly provided for, as in the case of Art. 6 of the 
European Software Directive, this, it seems, should be framed in much broader terms than the 
current legal rule.  
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